Abstract-Mobile peer-to-peer (P2P) networks have become increasingly popular, but the attacks and selfness of peers make it vulnerable. In this paper, a trust model based on participation is proposed for mobile P2P networks (called ParticipationTrust). It could deal with the egoistic and malicious behaviors. And the level of peer's participation could be calculated through the transaction participation and recommendation participation. A set of experiments show that the model is rational and effective.
I. INTRODUCTION
Peer-to-peer (P2P) network is prevalent and its core idea is that each peer in the network acts as both client and server. They can exchange data directly with other peers. The openness, anonymity, dynamic of P2P networks, doomed that they are unauthentic networks. Take into account this, to establish a trust relationship among peers is the primary objective of the P2P network security technology. In the last decade, with the rapid development of P2P technology, the security research of P2P networks has been duly noted, and a large number of achievements emerged, such as: SWRTrust [1] , PeerTrust [2] , GossipTrust [3] , BiTrust [4] and so on.
With the development of mobile Internet, the relevant applications have been highly regarded. It has good practical significance to apply P2P into the mobile Internet, to provide users with the service of resources sharing, to enhance the applicability of the mobile Internet, and to be placed at a high value by both industrial community and academia. Compared with traditional P2P networks, mobile P2P networks have the following characteristics:
(1) Limited capacity. This makes peers should take energy consumption into account when contribute resources and feedback evaluation data.
(2) Highly dynamic. The highly dynamic of peers will lead networks topology to change constantly, and bring more problems to networks management.
(3) Unreliable connection. Owing to wireless connection, the reliability of mobile P2P networks connection is worse than traditional P2P networks.
(4) Vulnerability. Peers in mobile P2P network are anonymous. This makes peers unstable and the mobile P2P network vulnerable.
Due to all the characteristics above, mobile P2P networks are more complicated than traditional P2P networks. Trust models in traditional P2P networks have not considered these characteristics, so they can't be used in mobile P2P networks directly. In decentralized P2P networks, due to the anonymous and self-organization nature of peers, they have to manage the risk involved with the transactions without prior knowledge about each other's reputation. Core issues of trust model in P2P environments to solve are: to achieve the computation, storage and distribution of trust data be distributed in the network, and in each of the above aspects, trust model should take up very little network resources, while ensuring scalability of the scale. This paper studies on critical point of mobile P2P networks, and proposes ParticipationTrust, a trust model for mobile P2P networks.
II. RELATED WORK

A. Trust Models for P2P Networks
With years of development of P2P networks, various aspects have been relatively mature [7] . The following summarizes the traditional trust models for P2P networks.
SWRTrust [1] is a trust model based on similarityweighted recommendation. It computes each peer's global reputation value by aggregating similarityweighted recommendation of the peers who have interacted with it. PeerTrust [2] is a trust model based on reputation. It computes each peer's trust value according to statistics and classifications of the peer's evaluation. RETM [10] is a recommendation evidence based trust model. Before combining the evidences, RETM filter out noisy recommendation information. It proposes a feedback-based probabilistic searching algorithm to improve the searching success ratio. GossipTrust [3] is a gossip-based reputation system for fast aggregation of global reputation scores. The gossip-based protocol is designed to tolerate dynamic peer joining and departure, as well as to avoid possible peer collusions. RBPT [11] is a role-based trust model. It is refined from the coarsegrained trust model, and uses heuristic-weighting approach to selecting the most reliable path to construct a role-based trust chain. PerformTrust [12] is a trust model integrated past and current performance. It considers both historical and current performance of a peer to determine peers' reputation. BiTrust [13] is a trust model based on mutual assessment. By request trust value and service trust value, peers in this model can be two-way choice. So malicious peers and selfish peers are suppressed.
B. Trust Models For Mobile P2P Networks
There is a significant difference between traditional P2P networks and mobile P2P networks, and then trust models for traditional P2P networks can't be directly applied to mobile P2P networks. Currently the study of trust models for mobile P2P networks has made a few achievements. Ref. [4] proposed a MobTrust which is a distributed data storage and evaluation of dual-feedback trust model for mobile P2P networks. This model ensures the integrity of trust information through files peers and transport the trust information, and reduces consumption when the trust information combining. Ref. [5] analyzed the design requirements of trust models for mobile P2P networks, and proposed three specific trust models for mobile P2P networks: GMPTM, group as a unit, hierarchical trust model; SGTM, trust model based on stability; DDM, distributed decision model. Ref. [14] proposed an accurate, efficient and scalable lightweight trust ratings aggregation scheme, designed a trust model for mobile P2P networks, M-trust, as the foundation of the scheme. Ref. [15] proposed a two-step secure authentication approach for multicast MANETs. First, a Markov chain trust model is proposed to determine the trust value (TV) for each one-hop neighbor. A node's TV is analyzed from its previous trust manner that was performed in this group. The proposed trust model is proven as an ergodic continuous-time Markov chain model. Second, the node with the highest TV in a group will be selected as the CA server. To increase reliability, the node with the second highest TV will be selected as the backup CA server that will take over CA when CA fails. The procedures of the secure authentication for group management are detailed.
III. A PARTICIPATION-BASED TRUST MODEL FOR MOBILE P2P NETWORKS
A. Relevant Definitions in the Model
In ParticipationTrust, each peer may have different roles: requesting resources peers (RRP), providing resources peers (PRP), recommending peers (RP). RRPs are peers that querying and collecting evaluation data of peers providing resources, computing trust value of peers providing resources, and sending resource requests or reelect peers providing resources according to the trust value; PRPs are peers that providing the necessary resources for the RRPs; RPs are peers that having one or more transactions with the PRPs, providing evaluation data for RRPs to compute indirect trust value.
Peers' role is determined by their current behavior. In ParticipationTrust, the main behaviors of peers are querying evaluation data, providing evaluation data, requesting resources, providing resources and so on. According to the characteristics of peers' historical behavior, peers are subdivided into normal peers, malicious peers, selfish peers and hypocritical peers. Among them, normal peers in the network not only provide resources but also request resources, make a fair evaluation of the quality of resources and provide the correct evaluation data as RPs. Malicious peers in the network spread malicious resources and destroy the network environment. Selfish peers obtain resources as much as possible without providing resources or evaluation data, this behavior is the so-called "free rider" [6] . Hypocritical peers attack tactful in the network. They at first perform normal behavior to get higher trust value, and then they perform malicious behavior. When trust value reduces to a certain extent they perform normal behavior again in order to increase trust value, so repeatedly.
Definition 1: Trust, peer x's subjective evaluation to another peer y's ability, honesty and reliability. Trust has the following properties [4] [5]: measurability, dynamic, transitivity, and asymmetry.
Definition 2: Direct trust value (DTV), in numerical form to quantify the level of trust peer x evaluates peer y which peer x transacted in the past.
Definition 3: Indirect trust value (ITV), peer x obtains y's evaluation data from RPs, integrates these data and computes peer y's ITV. ITV is in numerical form to reflect a peer y's reputation in the network.
Definition 4: Recommendation credibility (RC), it reflects peer x's trust level of peer y's evaluation data from peer y's RP.
This indicator is used to fix the evaluation data, filter inaccurate evaluation data. ParticipationTrust regards the recommendation as malicious recommendation when it deviates from the evaluation data which the majority of RPs given, as excellent recommendation when it closes to the evaluation data, others is general recommendation.
Definition 5: Participation (P), it embodies the peer's activity level in the transactions and trust management activities. It also reflects the peer's permission of accessing services and resources in the network. Participation has the following features.
(1) Measurability: peer x's participation reflects its activity level, with the [0, 1] metric interval, the closer to 1, the higher participation.
(2) Dynamic: peer x's participation changes with time, the criterion for judging is peer x's activity in a period of time.
Definition 6: Transaction Times (TTs), the times a peer that provides resources as PRP in the network. ParticipationTrust obtains this parameter to attenuate the previous transaction evaluation by a certain percentage, to tolerate dynamic peer joining and departure.
B. How to Compute Trust Value of Peers 1) Computation of the DTV
The DTV is related to previous TTs, transaction evaluation, and how long transactions past. In addition, if peer x is the RRP, while peer y is the PRP, then y's transaction evaluation given by x is positively related to the status of resources which are provided from peer y. In P2P networks, the resources' status is divided into five levels from bad to good [8] . G1 means the resources are malicious resources which contain viruses, Trojan horses and so on. G2 means the resources are spurious resources which don't match the requested resources. G3 means PRPs are unresponsive or reject the transaction. G4 means the resources are general resources. G5 means the resources are excellent resources that transmission rate is fast and stable. Table 1 shows the relationship between evaluation and state of resources in numerical form. Let EV represent the evaluation value. Assuming RRP x has transacted with PRP y N times, and E n is the trust evaluation that x gives y in N-th transaction. Then the DTV of x to y in (N+1)-th transaction is calculated in (1) 
The longer time since the transaction has been completed, the bigger the N-n is, and the smaller the n  is, i.e., the smaller the impact of transaction evaluation is.
2) Computation of the ITV Peer x has trust in peer y (ITV) computed by x integrated the RPs' direct trust in y. Before choosing y as a PRP and sending a resource request message, RRP x send queries to get the evaluation data on y and wait for the response of y's RPs. Let N represent that how many RPs responded to queries and D zy represent that one RP z's direct trust in y, then ITV that x has trust in y is calculated in (3):
 is the reliability of the recommendation and its value range is [0,1]. When calculating ITV of peers, majority of the RPs' evaluation prevail, and the evaluation may be inaccurate if it deviates from the major evaluation. is calculated in (4):
D is the average value of trust value that all RPs' trust in y. The greater the deviation ( zy D and D ) is, the lower the reliability of the RPs' evaluation is.
To encourage peers in the network to positively recommend and punish the peers which give inaccurate evaluation, ParticipationTrust introduces the concept of Recommendation Levels (RL). RL = {excellent, general, false} is RL's fuzzy set [9] . The RP will get a recommendation grade evaluation after the peer gives recommendation; the evaluation is selected from RL's fuzzy set by the RRP based on the recommendation information. 
α and β are the factors. They are used to weight the proportion of the DTV and ITV when calculating the trust value.
C. Participation 1) Compute the Participation
In ParticipationTrust, peer's participation is related to the extent of its historical activity in the network. Providing resources and evaluation data actively make the participation increased. In contrast, providing resources, evaluation data passively or providing malicious resources, inaccurate evaluation data makes the participation decreased. Participation reflects the peers' historical behavioral characteristics of providing resources and evaluation data in the network. It is the sole criterion for evaluating peers' permission and access priority in the network.
After receiving a resource request message from the RRP x and PRP y computes x's participation according to stored or collected data. Suppose x as a PRP, it received a total of p positive transaction evaluation (transaction evaluation value greater than 0.5), n negative transaction evaluation (transaction evaluation value less than or equal to 0.5). Suppose x as a RP, it gave a total of e excellent recommendation, f false recommendation, and g general recommendation.
Let P t (transaction participation) represent peer x's level of activity in providing resources in the network, it is calculated in (6):
Let P r (recommendation participation) represent peer x's level of activity in providing evaluation data in the network, it is calculated in (7):
r  and r  are recommendation confidence factors.
They are used to weight the proportion of the excellent recommendation and the general recommendation when calculating P r .
Thus, x's participation (P x ) can be calculated using the weighted average method. It is calculated in (8):
p  and p  are participation confidence factors. They are used to weight the proportion of transaction participation and recommendation participation when calculating participation.
2) Peer Permissions
In P2P networks, peers' malicious or selfish behaviors greatly affect the network's survival and development. We must develop appropriate suppression measures to ensure the stable development of the network. ParticipationTrust model adopts the participation to grade peers' permissions. When the peer is responding to evaluation data query or resource request from RRPs, the peer confirms their access priorities according to peers' permissions. Given the relatively high permissions to high participation peers makes it easier for them to access to resources and services.
Let AP = {0, general} indicate that the fuzzy set of peers' access permissions and A threshold P represent participation threshold. After receiving the evaluation data query or resource request from peer x, peer y compared the RRP's participation P x with threshold AP and determined the permission, and conferred the r x (access priority) on x.
-Access denied: A0
x threshold x P P r    , x is a malicious peer, and y refused to provide x with evaluation data or resources. The purpose of access denied is to punish malicious peers, ban their qualification of obtaining evaluation data and resources.
-Normal priority: y confers x (non-malicious peer) with the normal priority. If there were multiple peers request evaluation data or resources simultaneously from y, y sorted according to their participations and response from high to low, the peer have the highest participation got the highest access priority.
D. Peer Transaction Process
ParticipationTrust uses trust value as the criterion that a RRP selects PRPs, adopts participation as access priority judge criterion for PRPs and RPs response to RRPs. Therefore, the main work of peers' transactions is two-way choice between peers and updating the trust value and participation. RRPs only use PRPs' trust value as the criterion when they select PRPs. And only after receiving the evaluation data query or resource request, can the peer response to the RRP according to the access priority, which is measured by participation.
Peer transaction process showed in Fig. 1 , RRPs' operation flow can be described as follows:
Step 1: Select the peer: The RRP selects a peer optionally, if the selected peer's DTV is lower than a certain threshold, another peer will be selected until the selected peer meets the conditions.
Step 2: Query evaluation data: The RRP sends queries to get evaluation data of the selected peer. RPs feedback evaluation data when they receive queries.
Step 3: Compute the trust value: The RRP waits for a certain time after sending the queries. According to the evaluation data received and the stored selected peer's DTV, the RRP computes the trust value of the selected peer. If the trust value is greater than the threshold, the peer is selected as a PRP. Otherwise skip to Step 1 reelects peer.
Step 4: Evaluate recommendation data: When calculating the trust value, the RRP adopts  (recommendation credibility) to confirm the credibility of the evaluation data from RPs, then makes the appropriate recommendation grade evaluation for the evaluation data.
Step 5: Request resource: The RRP sends a resource request to the PRP, and wait for its response. If timeout response is not received or transaction is rejected, skip to
Step 1 re-elects PRP; if the RRP receives a tip to wait, it cannot transact until the PRP transacts with the high priority peers completely.
Step 6: Comment both sides: The RRP evaluates the resource provided by the PRP, and gives the evaluation of this transaction, then updates the PRP's TTs (affirmative, negative).
RPs' work is to determine the access priority of the RRPs when they receive evaluation data query from RRPs, and feedback evaluation data sequentially according to their access priority.
PRPs' work is to determine the access priority of the RRPs when they receive the resource request from RRPs, and decide whether to provide resources, feedback request results, provide resources to deal and give the RRPs evaluation.
E. Attack and Counter
In ParticipationTrust transaction evaluation less than or equal to 0.5 is a negative evaluation, therefore selfish peers that refuse to provide resources will also receive negative transaction evaluation (0.5), making the participation of selfish peers lower than normal peers and declining. That is selfish peers' access priority will be lower than normal peers'. Therefore, selfish peers are unable to obtain resources in the network gradually, cannot run "free rider" behavior.
For malicious peers, because they often feedback malicious recommendation or receive negative transaction evaluation, their participation and trust value will be very low. The peer transaction process shows that: peers neither response to peers' evaluation data query or resource request, whose participation is lower than the participation threshold, nor to request data from peers, whose trust value is lower than the trust threshold. This makes malicious peers be defended and cannot obtain resources they will be isolated gradually in the network.
For hypocritical peers, by introducing time attenuation rate and reliability of the recommendation make it difficult for them to obtain a higher trust value through strategic behavior. However, due to their behavioral variability, their participation will be close to normal peers'. For this reason, we increase both the weight of negative evaluation when computing the transaction participation and the weight of malicious recommendation when computing the recommendation participation, as a result, peers' participation decline (when peer is performing malicious behavior) at a higher rate than increase rate(when peer is performing normal behavior). So it is difficult for hypocritical peers to obtain a high participation.
So peers' transaction participation can be further described as followings:
Peers' recommendation participation can be further described as followings:
IV. SIMULATION EXPERIMENT AND RESULTS ANALYSIS
A. Experimental Environment
The main purpose of this experiment is to analyze the role of participation in trust management and the effectiveness of ParticipationTrust. This experiment analyzes mainly from two perspectives: transaction success rate and inhibits malicious peers, selfish peers, and hypocritical peers. This selection of Apache open source project PeerSim [16] for the simulation platform, through peer online ratio Po to simulate peers arbitrary join and leave the mobile P2P network, a new on-line peer's participation, trust value, and TTs etc. all the data is reset to the initial values. In the simulation platform, we add code to achieve the ParticipationTrust model, but also to achieve the PeerTrust model as a comparison. Table 2 shows the simulation parameters' settings.
B. Results Analysis
The primary task of trust model is to ensure the normal peers within the network trading activities. So we evaluate the effectiveness of ParticipationTrust through the transaction success rate and the inhibition of malicious peers, selfish peers and hypocritical peers. In order to analyze the experimental results better, this article compares reputation-based and only one-way trust model PeerTrust with ParticipationTrust.
Since malicious peers mainly destroy the network by spreading malicious resources, the paper evaluates the malicious peers' inhibition through the number change of malicious peers providing resource. Illustrated in Fig. 2 , in both models malicious peers provide resources proportion is around 25% in the first round of transactions. That's because all peers trust data initialization lacking of transactions between peers, leading a lack of trust data in the network.
After several rounds of transactions, malicious peers of the PeerTrust model are suppressed, and basically no longer as PRPs. While in ParticipationTrust, the state of malicious peers in providing resources is fluctuation. This is because ParticipationTrust is a trust model based on the mobile P2P network, after the peers back online its trust data will be reset (the so-called joining and departure attack), by recommendation credibility and number of evaluation to impact the trust, this kind of malicious peers will quickly be suppressed again. For selfish peers, because of its "free rider": obtain resources as much as possible without providing resources or evaluation data, we evaluate the inhibition situation to the selfish peers by analyzing the number of resources selfish peers obtained. Shown in Fig. 3 , PeerTrust model has no inhibitory effect on the selfish nodes, which uses trust value as the standard for peers obtain resources, as selfish peers never provide resources in the network, the trust value is maintained at the initial level, they can still obtain resources. Actually, with the expansion of the network, peers of PeerTrust model will not respond to all the requests, at this time, selfish peers' trust value is relatively low, the number of resources which they obtained will be significantly less than the normal peers obtained, but they can still get resources.
ParticipationTrust model uses a combination of transaction participation and recommendation participation as the standard obtain resources for a peer, so the request of selfish peers will quickly be suppressed, which is reflected in the experiment for the second round of transaction, the proportion of selfish peers obtain resources began to close to 0. In addition, the status of selfish peers of ParticipationTrust model obtaining resources is fluctuation. This is because ParticipationTrust is a trust model based on mobile P2P network. After peer back online, its participation will be emptied, through the (9), we have strengthened the weight of negative transaction in the calculation of participation, and the new on-line selfish peers can be suppressed again quickly. For hypocritical peers, because of its strategic behavior in the network: sometimes normal while sometimes malicious, we realize the analysis of the situation that inhibition of hypocritical peers through the rate change of providing resources and obtaining resources. Shown in Fig. 4 , the number of hypocritical peers provide resources and obtain response is fluctuation, which is determined by hypocritical peers' behavior strategy.
The number curve of hypocritical peers providing resources, the fall rate is greater than the growth rate, and the fall rate increase in general, while the growth rate has been reduced, which is due to the introduction concept of direct trust time attenuation rate and indirect trust recommendation credibility in the ParticipationTrust making hypocritical peers pay more if they want to promote their trust value. Furthermore, in the previous transaction rounds, the growth rate of providing resources is smaller than the back rounds, that is because the introduction concept of TTs in ParticipationTrust, making evaluation data of peers just entering do some attenuation to prevent joining and departure attacks.
The number curve of hypocritical peers obtaining resources, the fall rate is greater than growth rate and the fall rate increase in general, while the growth rate has been reduced. This is because ParticipationTrust aggravated malicious recommendation and malicious transactions in recommendation participation and transaction participation calculation weights (9) (10), with increased number of malicious recommendation and malicious resources given by hypocritical peers, it will be more difficult for hypocritical peers to promote their participation in the network. The reliability of trust model is mainly reflected by the assurance of normal peers' transactions, which is success rate of transactions. In the simulation experiment, taking the proportion of normal resources to total resources which peers obtained as the transaction success rate and conducting comparative analysis. Shown in Fig. 5 , we can see transaction success rate of both models are increased with the conduct of transactions. Transaction success rate of PeerTrust model will eventually approaches 1, while the transaction success rate of ParticipationTrust model does not increase steadily, but increase in fluctuation mode. That is because that ParticipationTrust introduces the concept of peer online rate, some peers' transaction data will re-initialize when once again on the line, malicious peers will always provide a certain number of malicious resources.
From above results in comparison with PeerTrust, we can see that, our proposed ParticipationTrust basically reaches the same level that PeerTrust inhibit the malicious peers and selfish peers, although we sacrificed the model performance to achieve the protective effect. Moreover, ParticipationTrust has better defense for most common attacks (joining and departure attacks) in mobile P2P environment.
C. Anti-attack capability
P2P network always has the following attacks. 1) Dishonest feedback. RRPs do not give the actual evaluation to the resources which PRPs provided, touting malicious peers or slandering normal peers; RPs feedback to the RRPs untrue evaluation data, influencing the judgment of RRPs. Aiming at the behaviors of dishonest feedback, ParticipationTrust introduces the concept of recommendation credibility into indirect trust value calculating, taking the major evaluation data of RPs as standard, the evaluation data that deviate from the majority opinions may be inaccurate. We reduce the dishonest feedback peers' participation in order to punish them according to RL. The disadvantage of this article is not reflected the dishonest feedback in the simulation experiment. We just deal with the dishonest feedback behaviors at a theoretical point of view.
2) DoS attack. RRPs through continuously sending evaluation data or resource request to other peers, making peers are tired of responding to the request and wasting peers' resources, so the peers cannot provide services to other request peers. Aiming at the DoS attack, we can introduce the concept of trust threshold. When peers accept a requesting from a peer, whose trust value is less than a certain threshold, the peers will not response in order to reduce the possibility of a DoS attack.
3) Collusion attack. Through cooperation, multiple peers conduct virtual transactions to enhance their own reputation or jointly conduct dishonest feedback to tout malicious peers, slander normal peers or simultaneously conduct DoS attack caused DDoS attack. Such collective form of behavior is much more serious than the malicious behavior of a single peer. This article discusses the trust management under the mobile P2P network, due to the autonomy of network formation, and the probability of collusion between peers is low. So we do not analyze such attacks. 4) Strategic attack. At first, peers obtain higher trust value and participation through multiple less costly transactions, and then they conduct malicious behaviors and operate like this over and over again. That is the behavior characteristics of hypocritical peers, obtaining maximum benefit through very little cost. By equation (9) and (10), ParticipationTrust increases the weight of negative evaluation in the transaction participation calculation and malicious recommendation in the recommendation participation calculation. Peers' participation decline (perform malicious behaviors) faster than growth (perform normal behaviors). So ParticipationTrust can ensure that hypocritical peers need to pay more to get a high participation. The protection of strategic attack is shown in Fig. 4 , which reflects the inhibitory effect of hypocritical peers.
5) Joining and departure attack. When malicious peers cannot obtain resources because of their low participation or spread malicious resources due to their low trust value, they can exit and rejoin the network to get new identifies, destroying the bad records and performing new malicious behaviors. Due to the characteristics of mobile P2P network, joining and departure attack is the most likely type of attacks. Such attack reflects the volatility of each simulation result. Through the parameter TTs, ParticipationTrust attenuates the previous transactions trust evaluation of new joined peers, making the participation and trust value of malicious peers decline even faster, the malicious peer cannot obtain high trust value and participation with a small amount of normal behaviors, preventing joining and departure attack.
V. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we summarized the characteristics of mobile P2P network. Secondly, we introduced the research status of trust technology under the mobile P2P network. Then we gave the basic concepts of ParticipationTrust, trust calculation process and peer transaction process. Finally, the effectiveness and resource overhead of the ParticipationTrust were simulated and analyzed, and the paper outlined the protection means against malicious attacks of ParticipationTrust.
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